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Abstract: State-machine-based replication is an effective way to increase the availabil ity and dependability of mission-critical
applications. However, all practical applications contain some degree of non-detenninism. Consequently, ensuring strong

replica consistency in the presence of application non-delcmlinism has been one of the biggest challenges in bu ilding
dependable di stributed systems. In th is Study, the authors propose a classification of common types of application non
detenninism with respect to the requirement of achieving Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), and present the design and
implementation of a BFT framework that controls these types of non-dctcnninism in a systematic manner.

1

Introduction

State-machine-based Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) [1 - 4]
is a promising approach to increasing the dependability of
mission-critical applications in the presence of malicious
attacks and other types of fau lts. The BFT algorithms
employed in such an approach require the replicas to
operate detenninistically, that is given the same request
under the same state, all replicas of the server produce the
same reply and transition to the same state. However, all
practical applications contain some degree of non
detenninism. When such applications are replicated to
achieve fault and intrusion tolerance, their non-detenninistic
operations must be controlled to ensure replica consistency.
Furthennore, unique to the Byzantine fault model, some
types of non-detemlinism, if not properly handled, can be
exploited to compromise the integrity of the services
provided.
To the best of our knowledge, only the most simplistic
types of non-delemlinism have been handled for the
Byzantine fault model (1- 4], which we tenn 'wrappable
non-detennin ism' and ' verifiable pre-deternlinable non
dctenninism'. The fomler means thai the non-detenninistic
operation and its side-effects can be mapped into some pre
specified abstract operations and state, which arc
detenninistic. The latter means that non-detenninistic values
can be detennined prior to the execution of a request, and
the values proposed by one replica can be verified by other
replicas in a detenninistic manner, and accepted if they are
believed to be correct.
The mechanisms designed to handle these types of non
detenninism [ 1- 4] either are not effective in guaranteeing

replica consistency and/or are not effective in masking
Byzantine faults, if the application to be replicated exhibits
other types of non-detemlinistic behavior. For example,
many online gaming app lications contain non-detemlinistic
va lues (e.g. random numbers that deternline the state of the
applications) that are proposed by one replica but cannot be
veri fied by another replica. 11 is dangerous to treat Ihis type
of non-detenninism in the same way as verifiable pre
detemlinable non-detenninism (V PRE) because a faulty
replica could use a predictable algorithm to update its
internal state and collude with its clients without being
detected, which would defeat the purpose of applying
existing BFT mechanisms. As another example, multi
threaded applications exhibit non-detenninistic values (e.g.
thread interleaving) that cannot be delemlined prior to the
execution of a request (without losing conculTCncy), which
cannot be handled by existing BFT mechanisms.
This paper makes several contributions:
• We introduce a classification of common types of replica
non-delemlinism present in many applications. The
classification is based on two criteria: whether or not the
non-dctemlinistic opcrations can be detennined prior to
the execution of a request, and whether or not the values
associated with the non-deterministic operations sent by one
replica can be verified by another replica. This classification
leads to four types of non-detenninism: VPRE, non
verifiable pre-determinable non-determinism (N PRE),
verifiable post-determinable non-detenninism (VPOST), and
non-verifiable post-detenninable non-detemlinism (NPOST).
• We describe a set of mechanisms that can be used to
control these Iypes of non-detenninistic operations. To cope

with non-veriﬁable pre-determinable non-determinism, we
propose to rely on the collective input from a quorum of
replicas, and a Byzantine agreement [5] step to ensure that
all non-faulty replicas agree on the same set of values. To
cope with NPOST, we propose to launch a monitoring
process prior to the execution at a backup and to compare
the generated reply message with the one supplied by the
primary.
† We have implemented the mechanisms and integrated
them into a well-known BFT framework [1 –4]. We present
the results of our performance evaluation of the working
prototype, which show that our mechanisms introduce very
moderate runtime overhead.

2

Background

In this section, we present background information related to
this research. First, we describe the fault models, then we
cover several replication techniques commonly used to
achieve fault tolerance under various fault models, together
with the concept of strong replica consistency. Next, we
discuss how the fault tolerance mechanisms are typically
positioned in practice. Finally, we focus on the concept of
BFT and present a popular BFT algorithm.
2.1

Fault models

Faults can be categorised as follows [6]:
† Crash fault: A crash fault occurs when a component of a
system operates correctly up to some point in time, after
which it produces no further results. For example, when the
power is lost, a crash fault occurs for any process running
on the host.
† Omission fault: An omission fault occurs when a
component produces some results but not others. Message
loss is an example of an omission fault.
† Timing fault: A timing fault occurs when a component
produces results at the wrong time, either too early or too late.
† Commission fault: A commission fault occurs when a
process generates incorrect results. A commission fault in
which a process generates incorrect results that are
intentionally designed to mislead the algorithms or other
components of the system is an example of a Byzantine fault.
In general, the crash fault model refers to a model in which
a process is subject to crash, omission and timing faults, but
not commission faults. The ‘benign fault model’ refers to a
model in which a process is subject to non-malicious
commission (i.e. non-Byzantine) faults, in addition to crash,
omission and timing faults. The ‘Byzantine fault model’
refers to a model in which a process is subject to arbitrary
types of faults.
2.2 Replication techniques and strong replica
consistency
The basic strategy to protect an application against faults is
replication, so that if one replica becomes faulty, another
replica is available to provide the service. However, with
replication comes a challenge: how to ensure that all nonfaulty replicas have consistent state. Maintaining strong
replica consistency is important because, otherwise, the
integrity of the system might be compromised. An example
is shown as part of the discussion on active replication
below.

Common replication techniques, and mechanisms for
ensuring strong replica consistency with respect to these
replication techniques, are the following:
† Active replication: Active replication is also referred to as
state-machine replication [7]. In active replication, all replicas
receive the client’s request, process it, generate and send back
the reply to the client. To maintain strong replica consistency,
all requests must be delivered in a total order to each replica.
To understand why the total ordering of requests is necessary,
consider the following on-line auction example. The server,
which runs the on-line auction application, is replicated
with two replicas R1 and R2. Two clients, C1 and C2, are
trying to outbid each other for an item (assuming only one
such item is available). At the closing moment of the
auction, C1 and C2 each place a bid with the same price
concurrently. If at R1, the bidding request m1 from C1 is
ordered ahead of the bidding request m2 from C2, C1
would be declared the winner of the auction by R1. On the
other hand, if at R2, m1 and m2 are ordered differently (i.e.
m2 is ahead of m1), C2 would be declared the winner by
R2. If this happens, the state of the two replicas diverge
and the integrity of the auction application is compromised,
which might require lengthy manual resolution. If m1 and
m2 had been totally ordered, then either C1 would have
been declared the winner by both replicas (if m1 is ordered
ahead of m2), or C2 would have been declared the
winner by both replicas (if m2 is ordered ahead of m1).
Active replication requires that each replica operates
deterministically. In the presence of non-deterministic
operations, inter-replica coordination is often needed to
ensure that all replicas use exactly the same set of values
for the non-deterministic operations, similar to the total
ordering requirement for requests.
† Passive replication: In passive replication [8], one of the
replicas is designated as the leader, referred to as the
primary, and the remaining replicas are backups. Only
the primary processes the client’s request, and sends back
the reply to the client. To ensure strong replica consistency
in the presence of replica non-determinism, the primary
must send the update of its state to the backups prior to the
sending of the reply, or it must send both the reply and the
state update atomically to all replicas and the client [8].
† Semi-active replication: Semi-active replication is a
variation of active replication [8]. One of the replicas is
designated as the primary, and the remaining replicas are
designated as backups. Even though all replicas process the
client’s request, only the primary sends back the reply to
the client, and most importantly, the primary determines the
total ordering of the request, records its decisions for all
non-deterministic operations (if present), and multicasts the
total order and decision data on the non-deterministic
operations to the backups, which use that information to
direct their own executions.
† Semi-passive replication: Semi-passive replication is a
variation of passive replication [9] in which the primary
communicates state updates to the backups for each
operation. The backups update their states, but do not
perform the operations and do not produce outgoing
messages. Semi-passive replication aims to reduce the cost
of recovery in the case of primary failure.
To provide BFT, we use active replication with an
agreement algorithm based on a quorum and with a primary
that receives messages from the clients and multicasts

messages to the backups, which return the results to the
clients.
2.3

Positioning of fault tolerance mechanisms

Regardless of the replication technique used, it is common
practice to implement the fault tolerance mechanisms in a
middleware layer sandwiched between the application (on
both the server and the client sides) and the operating
system, as shown in Fig. 1. The main advantage of this
practice is that it cleanly separates the application logic and
the fault tolerance logic. The application interacts with the
fault tolerance mechanisms via a predeﬁned set of
application programming interfaces [1] or transparently
through library inter-positioning [10].
All remote interactions between the client and the
replicated server have to go through the middleware layer.
To control replica non-determinism, all interactions between
the application and the operating system are mediated by
the middleware layer as well.
A request sent by a client to a server replica is ﬁrst received
at the middleware layer. Then a total order is imposed on the
message by the fault tolerance mechanisms, after which the
request is delivered to the application if all previous
requests have been delivered. Similarly, any non
deterministic value is ﬁrst obtained/decided by the fault
tolerance mechanisms and subsequently supplied to the
application at the appropriate time.
2.4

Byzantine Fault Tolerance

BFT refers to the capability of a system to tolerate Byzantine
faults. Replication techniques that rely on the input of a single
replica, such as passive replication, semi-active replication,
and semi-passive replication, are not appropriate for BFT,
because that replica, if it is Byzantine faulty, might
disseminate conﬂicting information to other replicas to
cause replica inconsistency. Therefore active replication
must be used.
The most well-known BFT algorithm is due to Castro and
Liskov [1]. The BFT algorithm is designed to support clientserver applications running in an asynchronous distributed
environment under the Byzantine fault model. The BFT
algorithm requires the availability of 3f + 1 replicas to
tolerate up to f Byzantine faulty replicas. The value of f that

should be used depends on the risk the system faces and the
desired degree of system reliability. It is conceivable that
f ¼ 1 would sufﬁce for many applications. Among the
3f + 1 replicas, one of them is designated as the primary
while the remaining replicas are backups. Note that the
primary does not enjoy the total authority as it does in the
replication techniques designed to cope with crash faults.
The input from the primary is checked by other non-faulty
replicas. If the primary is found to have disseminated
wrong or conﬂicting messages (or no message at all for a
sufﬁciently long duration), the primary is demoted to the
role of a backup and another replica is selected to replace it
using a round-robin scheme. This process is called a view
change.
According to the BFT algorithm, the request issued by the
client is captured by the fault tolerance mechanism in the
middleware layer, and is sent to the primary, which is
responsible to orchestrate the total ordering process. The
mechanism at the client side collects the corresponding
replies from the server replicas until it receives a consistent
reply from f + 1 server replicas, at which time it delivers
the reply to the client application. This mechanism ensures
that the reply must have been generated by a non-faulty
replica because there are at most f faulty replicas (according
to the assumption). Because the primary could be faulty,
the request is multicast to all replicas if a consistent reply
cannot be obtained from f + 1 replicas within a reasonable
time period.
As shown in Fig. 2, the normal operation of the BFT
algorithm involves three phases. During the ﬁrst phase
(called the pre-prepare phase), the primary multicasts a preprepare message to the backups containing the client’s
request, the current view number and a sequence number
assigned to the request. A backup veriﬁes the request
message and the ordering information. If the backup accepts
the message, it multicasts to all other replicas a prepare
message containing the ordering information and the digest
of the request being ordered. This starts the second phase,
that is the prepare phase. A replica waits until it has
collected 2f prepare messages from different replicas
(including the message it sent if it is a backup) that match
the pre-prepare message before it multicasts a commit
message to other replicas, which starts the third phase (i.e.
commit phase). The commit phase at a replica concludes
when the replica has received 2f matching commit

Fig. 1 Common practice is to implement the fault tolerance mechanisms in a middleware layer sandwiched between the application and the
operating system

These guidelines, however, are applicable to only a subset
of the problems that we address.

4

Classiﬁcation of replica non-determinism

We distinguish replica non-determinism into the following
three major categories:

Fig. 2 Normal operation of the BFT algorithm

messages from other replicas. At this point, the request
message has been totally ordered (i.e. all non-faulty replicas
have reached Byzantine agreement [5]) and the message
can be delivered to the server application if all previous
requests have already been delivered.

3

Related work

Replica non-determinism for the crash fault model [8, 10, 11 –
18] has been studied extensively. However, there is no
systematic classiﬁcation of common types of replica nondeterminism, and even less so for the uniﬁed handling of
such non-determinism. Classiﬁcations of some types of
replica non-determinism are provided by [8, 13, 14].
However, those types of non-determinism largely fall within
the types of wrappable non-determinism and VPRE, with the
exception of the non-determinism caused by asynchronous
interrupts, which we do not address in this work.
The replica non-determinism caused by multi-threading
has been studied separately from other types of nondeterminism, again, under the crash fault model in [10 – 12,
15, 16, 19]. These studies provide valuable insight on how
to approach the problem of ensuring consistent replication
of multi-threaded applications. What matters in achieving
replica consistency is to control the ordering of different
threads in their access to shared data. The mechanisms to
record and replay such ordering have been developed [10],
as have those for checkpointing and restoring the state of
multi-threaded applications (e.g. [20]).
As discussed in Section 2, a number of replication
techniques, including passive replication, semi-active
replication, and semi-passive replication [8– 10], have been
developed to cope with replica non-determinism under the
crash fault model. In those replication techniques, the
primary decides on the total ordering of messages and non
deterministic values, and such decisions are not veriﬁed by
the backups. These techniques are not applicable in the
presence of Byzantine faults because a faulty primary could
send conﬂicting or wrong decisions to the backups, which
would lead to the divergence of replica state. Nevertheless,
the previous research provides great insight on what
operations can lead to replica non-determinism, and how to
record and replay non-deterministic operations.
For the Byzantine fault model, the main effort of
controlling replica non-determinism control thus far is to
cope with wrappable and veriﬁable pre-determinable replica
non-determinism [1 – 4]. In [1], Castro and Liskov provide
brief but important and useful guidelines on how to
deal with the type of non-determinism that requires
collective determination of the non-deterministic values.

† Wrappable non-determinism: This type of replica nondeterminism is easily controlled by using an infrastructureprovided or application-provided wrapper function, ‘without
explicit
inter-replica
coordination’.
For
example,
information such as hostnames, process ids, ﬁle descriptors,
etc. can be determined group-wise. Another situation is
when all replicas are implemented according to the same
abstract speciﬁcation, in which case a wrapper function can
be used to translate between the local state and the groupwise abstract state, as described in [4].
† Pre-determinable non-determinism: In this type of replica
non-determinism, the values are known prior to the execution
of a request. This type of replica non-determinism requires
inter-replica coordination to ensure replica consistency. For
example, it is possible to know that a random number will
be needed during the execution of a request (e.g. from the
speciﬁcation of the remote method) and the BFT
mechanisms can decide which random number to use prior
to the execution.
† Post-determinable non-determinism: In this type of replica
non-determinism, the values are recorded only after the
request is submitted for execution and the non-deterministic
values won’t be known until the end of the execution. This
type of replica non-determinism also requires inter-replica
coordination to ensure replica consistency. For example, it
is virtually impossible to predeﬁne the thread interleaving
for a multi-threaded application prior to execution. The only
practical way is to record such interleaving at the primary
and enforce the same interleaving at the backups.
In this paper, we will not discuss wrappable nondeterminism further, because it can be dealt with using a
deterministic wrapper function without inter-replica
coordination, and also because it has been thoroughly
studied [4]. Instead, we focus on the remaining two types of
replica non-determinism.
Based on whether or not a replica can verify the non
deterministic values proposed (or recorded) by another
replica, replica non-determinism can be further classiﬁed
into the following types:
† Veriﬁable non-determinism: In this type of replica nondeterminism, the values can be veriﬁed by other replicas.
The veriﬁcation is done by comparing each value associated
with the non-deterministic operation of one replica with that
of another replica. Obviously, for a non-deterministic
operation, it is impossible to expect that the two values are
identical. For the purpose of veriﬁcation, a heuristic bound
on the differences in the values must be predetermined or
dynamically adjusted. If the bound is estimated incorrectly,
a backup might mistakenly suspect the primary due to the
out-of-bound value proposed by the primary, which might
lead to an unnecessary view change. However, the safety
property of the system will not be violated because of the
mistake.
† Non-veriﬁable non-determinism: In this type of replica
non-determinism, the values cannot be completely veriﬁed
by other replicas. Online gaming applications, such as

Blackjack [21] and Texas Hold’em [22], exhibit this type of
non-determinism. The integrity of services provided by
such applications depends on the use of secure random
number generators. For the best security, it is essential to
make the choice of a random number unpredictable, which
prevents another replica from verifying it.

Overall, as summarized in Fig. 3, our classiﬁcation yields
four types of replica non-determinism: VPRE, NPRE,
VPOST and NPOST.
In Fig. 4, we provide an example of each type of replica
non-determinism except VPOST, because we have yet to
identify a commonly used application that exhibits this type

Fig. 3 Classiﬁcation of common types of application non-determinism

Fig. 4 Examples of common types of replica non-determinism with pseudo-code, explanations, risk analyses and synopses of the solutions

of non-determinism. Fig. 4 also includes an analysis of the
risk of not controlling the non-determinism and a synopsis
of the solution for each type.
In practical applications, the execution of a request often
involves more than one type of non-determinism, for
example, both time-related non-determinism (which is of
the veriﬁable pre-determinable type) and multi-threading
related non-determinism (which is of the non-veriﬁable
post-determinable type). Thus, considering the possibility of
composite types of non-determinism, there can be 12
different combinations of non-determinism types. Because
we have yet to identify the VPOST non-determinism in
practical applications, we only consider the following seven
types of non-determinism:
† VPRE: Single type with veriﬁable pre-determinable nondeterminism.
† NPRE: Single type with non-veriﬁable pre-determinable
non-determinism.
† NPOST: Single type with non-veriﬁable post-determinable
non-determinism.
† VNPRE: Composite type with both veriﬁable predeterminable non-determinism and non-veriﬁable predeterminable non-determinism.
† VPRE-NPOST: Composite type with both veriﬁable predeterminable non-determinism and non-veriﬁable postdeterminable non-determinism.
† NPRE-NPOST: Composite type with both non-veriﬁable
pre-determinable non-determinism and non-veriﬁable postdeterminable non-determinism.
† VNPRE-NPOST: Composite type with veriﬁable predeterminable
non-determinism,
non-veriﬁable
predeterminable non-determinism, and non-veriﬁable postdeterminable non-determinism.

5 Controlling replica non-determinism
for BFT
In this section, we present the system model, application
program interfaces (APIs), mechanisms for controlling
different types of replica non-determinism for BFT, and
informal proofs of correctness for our mechanisms.
5.1

messages with the same execution order. In other words,
the request messages must be delivered to the server
application at all non-faulty replicas reliably in the same
total order.
To achieve the total ordering of messages, we use the BFT
algorithm [3]. In later sections, we describe how to integrate
our mechanisms for controlling replica non-determinism into
the BFT algorithm, so that non-faulty replicas agree on both
the message ordering and the non-deterministic values.
5.2

Application programming interface

The BFT framework is implemented as a library to be linked into
the application code (on both server and client sides). As shown
in Fig. 5, the client-server application and the BFT mechanisms
(within the BFT library) interact via a set of APIs. The APIs
contain downcalls to be invoked by the application for a
number of purposes, for example, to initialise the BFT library
with appropriate parameters and callback functions, to start
the event loop managed by the BFT library, and to send
requests to the server replicas. The APIs also contain upcalls
to be implemented by the application, so that the BFT
mechanisms can deliver requests to the server application,
retrieve and verify non-deterministic values (if applicable),
and retrieve and restore application state.
The core upcall APIs used to control replica nondeterminism are described below:
int propose_value(Seqno seqno, Byz_req
*req, int *ndet_type, Byz_buffer *ndet);
This function is called when a replica wishes to ﬁnd out the
type of non-determinism involved in the request and to obtain
its share of non-deterministic values (if applicable). In this
API, seqno is the sequence number assigned to the client’s
request, req is a pointer to the request message,
ndet_type is a pointer to the type of non-determinism the
replica might exhibit when executing the request, and ndet
is a pointer to the buffer that stores the non-deterministic
values. This function returns appropriate values to indicate if
the call is successful. Both ndet_type and ndet are out

System model

We consider a client-server application operating in an
asynchronous distributed environment. To achieve liveness,
it is necessary to assume a certain degree of synchrony.
Like [3], we assume that the message transmission time and
the processing time have an asymptotic upper bound.
Both the client and the server can be Byzantine faulty, that
is they can exhibit arbitrary faults. To achieve BFT, the server
is replicated with 3f + 1 replicas to tolerate up to f faulty
nodes. We assume that messages are protected by a digital
signature or an authenticator [23] to ensure their integrity.
We assume that the adversaries have limited computing
power so that they cannot break the digital signatures or
authenticators of non-faulty replicas.
Each replica is modeled as a state machine. The replica is
required to run, or rendered to run deterministically. The
state change is triggered by remote invocations of the
methods offered by the replica. In general, the client ﬁrst
sends its request to the primary replica. The primary replica
then broadcasts the request message to the backup replicas
and also determines the execution order of the message. All
non-faulty replicas must agree on the same set of request

Fig. 5 Positioning of the application and the BFT library, and the
core interfaces between the two components

parameters, which means the application is expected to set
their values.
int check_value(Seqno seqno, Byz_req
*req, int *ndet_type, Byz_buffer *ndet);
This function is invoked when a backup replica wants to
verify the type of non-determinism and the non
deterministic values received from the primary replica (if
applicable). The parameters are the same as those for the
propose_value() function. The only difference is that
ndet_type and ndet are now used as in parameters,
which means that the information is passed to the
application. The veriﬁcation result is returned to the caller
in the return value.
int execute(Byz_req *req, Byz_rep *rep,
Byz_buffer *ndet, int cid, bool ro);
This function is called to deliver a request message to the
application, together with the non-deterministic values. For
operations with post-determinable non-determinism, this
function is called by the primary to retrieve the recorded
non-deterministic values. In this API, req is a pointer to
the request message, rep is a pointer to the reply message
to be generated by the replica, and ndet is a pointer to the
non-deterministic values. The ndet parameter is an in-out
parameter. Depending on the type of replica nondeterminism, it might be an in parameter, which means that
it points to the buffer that stores the non-deterministic
values to be used by each replica, or an out parameter when
a replica has post-determinable non-determinism and the
function is invoked at the primary replica.
5.3

BFT mechanisms

The BFT mechanisms work as follows. When the primary
receives a client’s request, if it is ready to order the
message, it invokes the propose_value() callback
function registered by the application. The application
supplies the type of non-determinism involved in the
execution of the request and, if applicable, the non
deterministic values.
The original BFT algorithm is extended with two
communication phases, namely, the pre-prepare-update
phase and the post-commit phase. In each phase, a new
control message referred to by the phase name is introduced.
The pre-prepare-update message is used in the
additional phase for the replicas to reach Byzantine
agreement on the collection of non-deterministic values
contributed by different replicas when NPRE is present. The
post-commit message is used in the additional phase for
the replicas to reach Byzantine agreement on the non
deterministic values recorded by the primary replica after it
has executed a request message (hence, the name postcommit when post-determinable non-determinism is present.)
In the following subsubsections, we provide detailed
descriptions of the mechanisms for controlling each single
type of non-determinism. The handling of composite types
is straightforward. Using the same example given in Section
4, the time-related non-deterministic values can be
determined during the pre-prepare-update phase, and the
multi-threading-related non-determinism can be resolved in
the post-commit phase. Note that to cope with composite
types of replica non-determinism, the data structure used
to store the non-deterministic values does not need to be
made more sophisticated because it is the application’s

responsibility to generate and interpret the non-deterministic
values, and for the same reason, there is no need to change
the APIs.
5.3.1 Controlling VPRE non-determinism: If the nondeterminism for the operation at the primary is of the type
VPRE, the application provides the non-deterministic values
in the ndet parameter. The obtained information is
included in the pre-prepare message, and the message
is multicast to the backup replicas.
On receiving the pre-prepare message, a backup
replica invokes the check_value() callback function.
The replica passes the information received regarding the
non-determinism type and data values to the application, so
that the application can verify that (i) the type of nondeterminism for the client’s request is consistent with what
is reported by the primary, and (ii) the non-deterministic
values proposed by the primary is consistent with its own
values. If either check is false, the check_value() call
returns an error code, the backup replica then suspects the
primary. Otherwise, the backup replica accepts the client’s
request and the ordering information speciﬁed by the
primary, logs the pre-prepare message and multicasts a
prepare message to all other replicas. From now on, the
algorithm works the same as the original BFT algorithm,
with the exception that the prepare and commit
messages also carry the digest of the non-deterministic
values. The normal operation of the modiﬁed BFT
algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 6.
5.3.2 NPRE non-determinism: If the non-determinism
for the operation at the primary is of the type NPRE, the
application at the primary proposes its non-deterministic
values. The type of non-determinism and the non
deterministic values are included in the pre-prepare
message, and the message is multicast to all backup replicas.
On receiving the pre-prepare message, a backup
replica invokes the check_value() callback function to
verify the non-determinism type supplied by the primary
replica (after it has veriﬁed the client’s request and the
ordering information). If the veriﬁcation is successful, the
backup replica invokes the propose_value() function
to obtain its own non-deterministic values. It then builds a
pre-prepare-update message including its own non
deterministic values, and sends the message to the primary.
When the primary receives 2f pre-prepare-update
messages from different backup replicas (for the same client
request), it builds a pre-prepare-update message,

Fig. 6 Normal operation of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in
handling veriﬁable pre-determinable non-determinism

including the 2f + 1 sets of non-deterministic values, each
protected by the proposer’s authenticator. The pre
prepare-update message itself is further protected by
the primary’s authenticator. The primary then multicasts the
message to all backup replicas. From now on, the BFT
algorithm operates according to the original algorithm,
except that the prepare and commit messages also carry
the digest of the non-deterministic values, and the 2f + 1
sets of non-deterministic values are delivered to the
application as part of the execute() upcall. The normal
operation of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm for this type of
non-determinism is illustrated in Fig. 7.
5.3.3 VPOST non-determinism: The normal operation of
the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in handling this type of nondeterminism is shown in Fig. 8. The primary includes the
non-determinism type (i.e., VPOST) in the pre-prepare

Fig. 7 Normal operation of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in
handling NPRE

Fig. 8 Normal operations of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in
handling veriﬁable post-determinable non-determinism

message without any non-deterministic values and
multicasts the message to the backup replicas.
On receiving the pre-prepare message, a backup
replica performs the check_value() upcall if it has
veriﬁed the client’s request and the ordering information. If
the backup replica conﬁrms the type of non-determinism, it
proceeds to the commit phase as usual. Otherwise, the
backup replica suspects the primary.
When the primary is ready to deliver the request message, it
proceeds to perform the execute() upcall and expects to
receive both the reply message and the recorded non
deterministic values. Once the upcall returns, the primary
stores the retrieved post-determined non-deterministic
values, together with the digest of the reply, into a postnd
log (to be sent to the backup replicas), and sends the reply
message to the client. The digest of the reply is included in
the postnd log, so that a backup replica can verify that the
primary has actually used the non-deterministic values to
generate the reply.
A post-commit phase is needed for the primary to disseminate
the data in the postnd log to backup replicas and for all nonfaulty replicas to ensure that they have received the same set
of values for the corresponding request. Unlike the pre
prepare-update phase for controlling the NPRE nondeterminism type, the post-commit phase involves all of the
steps needed for non-faulty replicas to reach an agreement on
the non-deterministic values, which requires three rounds of
message exchange similar to those used to determine the
ordering of the requests under normal operation. For the NPRE
non-determinism type, the prepare and commit phases needed
for the non-faulty replicas to reach Byzantine agreement on
the non-deterministic values are integrated with those for the
corresponding request message. We cannot do so for postdeterminable non-determinism types because the ordering for
the corresponding request has already been decided.
A backup replica does not deliver a request message until
Byzantine agreement has been reached on the non
deterministic values for the request. If Byzantine agreement
cannot be reached, or the veriﬁcation of the non
deterministic values fails, a backup replica suspects the
primary. Furthermore, when the backup replica produces a
reply for the request, the digest of the reply is compared with
that supplied by the primary. If the two do not match, the
backup replica suspects the primary. Regardless of the
comparison result, the backup replica sends the reply
message to the client. It is safe to do so because the result is
valid if all non-faulty backup replicas produce the same
reply using the same set of non-deterministic values (even if
they differ from the set actually used by the primary, which
implies that the primary is lying and will be suspected).
5.3.4 NPOST non-determinism: The handling of
NPOST involves the same steps as those described in the
previous subsubsection until a backup replica is ready to
deliver the request with the post-determined non
deterministic values, as shown in Fig. 9.
The concern here is that a faulty primary could disseminate
a set of incorrect non-deterministic values hoping either to
confuse the backup replicas, or to block them from
providing useful services to their clients. For example,
if the non-deterministic values contain thread-ordering
information, a faulty primary can arrange the ordering in
such a way that it leads to the crash of a backup replica
(e.g. if the attacker knows the existence of a software bug
that leads to a segmentation fault), or it might cause a
deadlock at a backup replica (the replica might perform

† Q is the set of records for the requests that have been preprepared at sender i in previous views.
† PP is the set of records for the requests that have been postprepared (on non-deterministic values) at sender i in previous
views.
† PQ is the set of records for the requests that have reached
the post-pre-prepared state at sender i in previous views.

Fig. 9 Normal operation of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in
handling NPOST

deadlock analysis before it follows the primary’s ordering to
prevent this from happening).
Because, in general, a backup replica cannot completely
verify the correctness of the non-deterministic values until it
executes the request, it is important for the replica to launch
a separate monitoring process prior to invoking the
execute() call. If the replica encounters a deadlock or a
crash fault, the monitoring process can restart the replica
and suspect the primary.
If it can successfully complete the execute() upcall, the
backup replica performs the same reply veriﬁcation procedure
as that described in the previous subsubsection, and sends the
reply to the client.
5.4

View change

A faulty primary might prevent a non-faulty backup replica
from reaching Byzantine agreement on the ordering of the
application message and/or the associated non-deterministic
values, in which case, a view change becomes necessary.
Moreover, it might take several view changes for a replica
to reach Byzantine agreement, and different replicas might
reach Byzantine agreement in different views. It is
important to ensure that adequate information is propagated
from one view to another, so that if two replicas reach
Byzantine agreement in different views, they agree on the
same total ordering and the same non-deterministic values.
The view change mechanism for message ordering involves
two control messages, that is, view-change and newview messages. A non-faulty replica suspects the primary
and initialises the view change if (i) its view change timer
expires, or (ii) it cannot verify the non-deterministic values
(for veriﬁable non-determinism), or it generates a different
reply (for non-veriﬁable non-determinism).
The view change message has the form k VIEW-CHANGE ,
v + 1, n, C, P, Q, PP, PQ, ilsi , where n is the sequence
number of the latest stable checkpoint s known to replica i,
C is the proof of s, i is the identiﬁer of the sender, and P,
Q, PP and PQ are deﬁned as follows:
† P is the set of records for the requests that have been
prepared at sender i in previous views.

The sets P and Q are required for requests. The sets PP and
PQ are used to reach agreement on non-deterministic values
for requests with post-determinable non-determinism. The
sets P, Q, PP and PQ have the same form kdm , dnd , n, v, tl,
where dm is the digest of the request, dnd is the digest of the
non-deterministic value, n is the sequence number, v is the
view number, and t is the type of non-determinism.
A replica updates these sets of information immediately
before sending the view-change message by using the
records in its log. On sending the view-change message,
the replica removes all prepare, pre-prepare,
commit,
post-pre-prepare,
post-prepare,
post-commit messages from the log, because those
messages are no longer useful.
When a replica receives a view-change message, it
accepts the message, provided that all of the information in
P, Q, PP and PQ is for view v or an earlier view. The
replica sends a view-change-ack message to the
primary in view v + 1 if it accepts the view-change
message. The view-change-ack message has the form
kVIEW-CHANGE-ACK , v + 1, i, j, dlsi , where i is the sender
id, j is the identiﬁer of the sender of the view-change
message being acknowledged, and d is the digest of the
view-change message.
The primary in view v + 1 collects each view-change
message and the 2f corresponding view-change-ack
messages, and stores them as an entry of an internal log S.
Each entry of S is for a different replica. When the new
primary receives 2f + 1 valid view-change messages, it
constructs a new-view message using the information in S
and multicasts the message to other replicas. The newview message has the form kNEW-VIEW, v + 1, V, Xlsi ,
where V contains the proof of the view change and X
contains the checkpoint that determines the starting state of
the new view, and a set of requests, for each sequence
number between h and h + L, with the associated non
deterministic values to reach agreement across views. (Here,
h is the log’s low watermark and L is the size of the log.)
The checkpoint and the set of requests are updated each
time the new information is added to S.
The primary in view v + 1 chooses the checkpoint ﬁrst
from the information in S with the highest sequence number
greater than h in the log of which at least f + 1 non-faulty
replicas from the set are known to be correct. Then, the
primary chooses a request together with the associated non
deterministic values, if necessary, for each sequence
number within the range h to h + L to pre-prepare in the
new view v + 1. For pre-determinable types of nondeterminism, the same request determination procedure is
used as that of [9]. For post-determinable types of nondeterminism, after the request is determined, a similar
procedure is used to determine which non-deterministic
values should be adopted. If no non-deterministic values
can be adopted, a NULL value is included in the newview message and the new primary will propose new
values when the request is re-executed.
The primary in view v + 1 updates its own state to reﬂect
the contents of the message after sending the new-view

message. It fetches the state from other replicas if any
requests, non-deterministic values, or checkpoints are
missing. Then, it logs all requests as pre-prepared in v + 1.
When a backup in view v + 1 receives the new-view
message, it veriﬁes the message by checking the new view
certiﬁcate V in the new-view message with the viewchange messages it has collected. If a backup did not
receive a view-change message from some replica
included in V, it asks the primary to send it a proof of
correctness that contains the original view-change
message and 2f acknowledgments. The backup
subsequently veriﬁes the information by repeating the same
procedure as that used by the primary to construct the
new-view message. If the veriﬁcation fails, the replica
moves to another view immediately. Otherwise, it resumes
normal operation for each request.
5.5

Proof of correctness

We now provide an informal proof of correctness for our
mechanisms. We argue here only for the correctness of
the safety property of our mechanisms. For the liveness
property, the correctness proof for the original BFT
algorithm can be directly applied to our mechanisms.
Theorem 1: If a non-faulty replica delivers a request m with a
sequence number n and a set of non-deterministic values nd in
view v, then no other non-faulty replica delivers m with a
different sequence number or a different set of non
deterministic values, and each non-faulty replica uses, or
records (in the case of the primary), the same set of non
deterministic values for request m.
Proof: First, we prove that, if two non-faulty replicas deliver
m in the same view v, then they also deliver the same set of
non-deterministic values nd with m in the same total order.
For the VPRE type, the non-deterministic values are
proposed by the primary and the agreement on the values is
carried out with the request message itself. If non-faulty
replicas agree on the ordering of the request message, they
agree on the non-deterministic values as well. For the
NPRE type, the non-deterministic values are collectively
determined in the pre-prepare-update phase, and the
consensus on the values is achieved by the three-phase
Byzantine agreement algorithm. Again, if some non-faulty
replicas commit the request m, they also agree on the
associated non-deterministic values. For the VPRE and
NPRE types, when the request m is delivered at a non-faulty
replica, the non-deterministic values that have been agreed
on are also delivered and used for execution.
For the VPOST and NPOST types, the agreement on the
non-deterministic values among non-faulty replicas is
guaranteed by the three-phase Byzantine agreement
algorithm executed during the post-commit phase. When
the request m is delivered at a non-faulty backup replica,
the non-deterministic values associated with m are also
delivered. The primary, if it is not faulty, must have
recorded the non-deterministic values during its execution
of m, and have disseminated the values to the backups
during the post-commit phase. Therefore the same set of
non-deterministic values are used for execution at the
primary (if it is not faulty) and the non-faulty backup replicas.
Next, we prove that the same statement is true if two nonfaulty replicas deliver m in different views. Without loss of
generality, we assume replica Ri delivers m in view v, and
replica Rj delivers m in view w, where w . v.

Because Ri delivered m in view v, it must have committed
m with a sequence number n. If the replica non-determinism
associated with m is of the type VPRE or NPRE, then Ri must
have also committed the set nd of non-deterministic values.
This implies that 2f + 1 replicas must have prepared m with
n and nd. During a view change, the mechanism ensures
that the new primary in view w must have collected the
prepare records for m and, thus, the association of m with n
and nd will be propagated from view v to view w. Hence,
Rj cannot commit m to another n or nd.
If the replica non-determinism associated with m is of the
type VPOST or NPOST, there exist only two cases: Ri is the
primary in view v or Ri is a backup. If Ri is the primary
(and it is not faulty), it can deliver m before the postcommit phase. However, this does not pose a problem
because the Byzantine agreement for the set of non
deterministic values associated with m (recorded at Ri) is
guaranteed to complete in view v. We have already proved
the correctness of our mechanism in this case. Next, we
consider the case where Ri is a backup. It delivers the
message m only after it has reached Byzantine agreement
for the ordering of both m and the set nd of non
deterministic values. Therefore the association of m with n
and nd must have been propagated from view v to view w,
and Rj can commit m only with n and nd in view w. This
completes the proof.
A

6 Implementation and performance
evaluation
We have implemented the mechanisms described in the
previous section in C + + and integrated them into the
BFT framework [1 – 4]. The development and test platform
consists of 14 HP blade servers running Ubuntu Server
9. Each of the blade servers is equipped with two QuadCore Intel Xeon 2 GHz CPUs with 5 GB of memory. The
nodes are connected via a Cisco Catalyst Blade Switch
3020 that offers full duplex 1 Gbps Ethernet connections.
The experiments described below focus on the evaluation
of the overhead of providing Byzantine fault tolerance to
the non-deterministic applications in the BFT layer. The
cost associated with recording non-deterministic values,
verifying those values, and replaying those values in the
application layer is not studied in this work. First, we
present the performance evaluation results using a single
client with respect to various types of non-determinism and
various size non-deterministic data (by non-deterministic
data we mean the set of non-deterministic values associated
with a type of non-determinism). Next, we present the
results using various numbers of concurrent clients. Finally,
we report the impact of our mechanisms on the end-to-end
latency during view changes.
6.1

Basic performance evaluation

Figs. 10 and 11 show a summary of the end-to-end latency
and throughput measurements for a client-server application
under normal operation for different types of nondeterminism. To avoid clutter, we have separated the results
for single types of non-determinism from those for
composite types of non-determinism; the results for single
types are shown in the left ﬁgure, while those for composite
types are shown in the right ﬁgure. In each iteration, each
client issues a request to the server replicas and waits for
the corresponding reply. There is no wait time between
consecutive iterations. The size of each request and reply is

Fig. 10 End-to-end latency for requests with different types of replica non-determinism under normal operation

Fig. 11 Throughput for requests with different types of replica non-determinism under normal operation

ﬁxed at 1 KByte. For each run, we measured the total elapsed
time for 100 000 consecutive iterations at each client, and
calculated the average end-to-end latency and throughput.
The type of non-determinism and the size of non
deterministic data vary in different experiments, except for
the throughput measurements, where the non-deterministic
data are ﬁxed at 256 Bytes for each type. Note that the sizes
of non-deterministic data shown in Fig. 10 on the
horizontal axis are for each type, which means that, for
composite types, the total size of non-deterministic data is
twice or three-times as large as those displayed.
Except for the VPRE type, the handling of other types of
non-determinism involves one or more phases of message
exchange for non-faulty replicas to reach Byzantine
agreement on the non-deterministic data. Thus, as shown in
Fig. 10, the end-to-end latency is noticeably larger, and the
throughput is smaller, than for the VPRE type. The end-to
end latency difference is more signiﬁcant as the size of
non-deterministic data involved in each operation increases.
The results shown in Figs. 10 and 11 are obtained after a
number of optimisations to the mechanisms described
previously. Without these optimisations, the latency is
signiﬁcantly larger and the throughput is much smaller,
except for the VPRE type. These optimisations are
described below.
In the pre-prepare-update phase, which is needed to handle
NPRE non-determinism, each backup replica multicasts its
contribution of the non-deterministic data to all of the other
replicas, and the primary decides on the collection (which
includes the contributions from 2f + 1 replicas, including its

own) to be used to calculate the ﬁnal non-deterministic
data. Instead of multicasting the collection of non
deterministic data, the primary disseminates the collection
of digests of the values proposed by each replica. This
sharply reduces the message size if the size of non
deterministic data is large. Because each replica can log the
non-deterministic data received from other replicas, a
backup replica can verify the digests provided by the
primary using its local copies. If a backup replica has not
received the values proposed by one or more replicas
included in the primary’s message, the replica asks for
retransmission of the values.
During the post-commit phase, which is needed to handle
NPOST non-determinism, the data in the postn log is
piggybacked with the pre-prepare message for the next
request. In this way, the Byzantine agreement for the non
deterministic data is reached together with that for ordering
of the request, which reduces the number of messages
needed to handle this type of non-determinism. Even
though the end-to-end latency for a request increases
slightly as a result, the system throughput is signiﬁcantly
improved. To avoid waiting indeﬁnitely for the next
request, the primary sets a timer. When the timer expires,
the primary initiates the Byzantine agreement phases for the
non-deterministic data in conjunction with a null request so
that the existing mechanisms can be reused.
It might be surprising to see in Fig. 10a crossover point of
the graphs for the end-to-end latency for requests with NPRE
non-determinism data and those with NPOST nondeterminism data. When the size of the non-determinism

data is small, the end-to-end latency for requests with NPRE
non-determinism is smaller than that for requests with
NPOST non-determinism. However, as the size of the nondeterminism data increases, the latency for requests with
NPRE non-determinism data increases rapidly and becomes
greater than that for requests with NPOST non-determinism
data. The reason is that, even with the optimisation, the pre
prepare-update phase (needed to handle the NPRE type) still
involves at least two large messages (one message per
backup replica for its proposed non-deterministic values),
while the post-commit phase (needed to handle the NPOST
type) involves only one large message (sent by the
primary). For the NPOST non-determinism type, there are
two more rounds of message exchange than for the NPRE
non-determinism type, which leads to a larger end-to-end
latency when the size of the non-deterministic data is small.
However, as the size of the non-determinism data becomes
larger, the transmission delay for the messages that contain
the non-determinism data begins to dominate, which results
in a much faster increase in the end-to-end latency for
requests with the NPRE non-determinism data, and
eventually surpasses that for requests with NPOST nondeterminism data. The crossover for the throughput results
shown in Fig. 11 occurs for the same reason.
To illustrate the overhead of our mechanisms for controlling
various types of non-determinism with respect to the original

BFT algorithm, we show in Fig. 12a the end-to-end latency of
each invocation when there is no replica non-determinism,
and when each of the seven types of non-determinism (with a
data size of 256 Bytes for each type of non-determinism) is
present in the system. As expected, the end-to-end latency for
VPRE non-determinism data is only slightly higher than that
when no non-determinism is present, and the end-to-end
latency is signiﬁcant higher in the presence of NPOST nondeterminism data, because it requires another around of
Byzantine agreement. Nevertheless, the end-to-end latency is
the largest (and the throughput is the smallest) in the presence
of triple types of non-determinism (i.e., VNPRE+NPOST).
The overhead of handling composite types of nondeterminism is expected to be the sum of the overhead of
handling each single type of non-determinism. To verify
this, we computed the expected latency for each composite
type by superimposing the overhead of each individual type
of non-determinism involved, and compared it with the
measured latency. As shown in Figs. 12b – e, the computed
latency is virtually identical to the measured result,
conﬁrming our expectation.
6.2

Performance evaluation under heavier loads

To investigate the performance of our framework under
heavier loads, we use multiple concurrent clients that

Fig. 12 End-to-end latency for various non-determinism types and data sizes
a End-to-end latency comparison without non-determinism, and with seven types of non-determinisms (VPRE , NPRE , NPOST, VNPRE , VPRE + NPOST,
NPRE + NPOST and VNPRE + NPOST ) represented by the numbers from 1 to 7, respectively
b– e Comparisons for the measured latency and the expected value obtained by superimposing the overhead of individual non-determinism for the following
composite types of non-determinism (VNPRE , VPRE + NPOST, NPRE + NPOST, VNPRE + NPOST ), respectively

Fig. 13 End-to-end latency for requests with different types of replica non-determinism in the presence of multiple concurrent clients under
normal operation

Fig. 14 Throughput for operations with different types of replica non-determinism in the presence of multiple concurrent clients under normal
operation

Table 1

End-to-end latency during view changes

Non-determinism type

BFT with no ND
VPRE
NPRE
NPOST

End-to-end latency, s
128 KB

256 KB

512 KB

1024 KB

2048 KB

4096 KB

5.303915
5.303713
5.304126
5.304225

5.303834
5.304294
5.304572

5.304212
5.304016
5.304388

5.304548
5.303665
5.304486

5.30449
5.30423
5.304382

5.304659
5.304159
5.304593

issue requests at the replicated server. Each of the clients
sends 100 000 request consecutively, where the size of the
non-deterministic data is ﬁxed at 256 Bytes. The results are
summarised in Figs. 13 and 14. As for the basic
performance evaluation, we present the results for the single
types of non-determinism and those for the composite types
of non-determinism separately.
Interestingly, the end-to-end latency results shown in
Fig. 13 also contains a crossover point, that is, the end-to
end latency for the requests with NPOST non-determinism
data is greater than that for NPRE non-determinism data
when the number of concurrent clients is less than
7. However, starting with eight concurrent clients, the
latency for the requests with NPOST non-determinism data
falls below that of the requests with NPRE non-determinism
data. The crossover can also be seen in the throughput
measurement results in Fig. 14, although it is less obvious.
The reason for this crossover is that, for requests with
NPOST non-determinism data, when there is a sufﬁcient
number of concurrent clients, virtually all post-determinable
non-deterministic data are piggybacked with the preprepare messages for other requests, rather than being
sent as separate messages. The piggybacking mechanism
effectively prevents the rapid increase in the end-to-end
latency when the load on the system becomes higher and,
similarly, helps to improve the throughput for requests with
NPOST non-determinism data.

use the end-to-end latency measured at the client as the
metric to evaluate the impact of our mechanisms. In our
experiment, a single client is used, and some requests
generated by the client are instrumented, so that they trigger
the crash of the primary, which leads to a view change.
Consequently, the end-to-end latency for such requests
includes the round-trip latency during normal operation, the
time it takes to detect the primary failure, and the view
change latency. During the experiment, a 5 s view change
timer, and a 150 ms message retransmission timer are used.
Furthermore, a view change always succeeds and no
message is lost during the view change.
The experimental results for various scenarios (different
non-determinism types, including the scenario without any
non-determinism, which is labeled BFT with no ND, and
different sizes of non-deterministic data) are summarised in
Table 1. As can be seen, the end-to-end latency remains
virtually the same for all scenarios. This is expected
because the handling of non-deterministic data during a
view change has minimum impact on the view change
latency. According to the modiﬁed view change mechanism
described in Section 5.4, only the digest of the non
deterministic data is piggybacked onto the view-change
and new-view messages. Therefore the handling of nondeterminism has virtually no effect on the performance of
the view change. During our experiment, no message is
lost. The view change latency might be larger if a message
that contains non-determinism data is lost and has to be
retransmitted.

6.3 Impact on end-to-end latency during view
changes
So far, we have reported the experimental results for normal
operation. In this section, we present the results that
characterise the impact of our mechanisms on the
performance of the BFT tolerance framework during view
changes, that is when the primary is faulty. We choose to

7

Conclusion and future work

In this paper, we have presented the design and
implementation of a BFT framework for non-deterministic
applications. First, we described a novel classiﬁcation of
common types of application non-determinism based on

two criteria: (i) whether or not the values associated with the
non-deterministic operations can be determined prior to the
execution of a request, and (ii) whether or not the values
proposed by one replica can be veriﬁed by another replica.
This approach led to four types of non-determinism.
Furthermore, we highlighted the risks incurred when such
non-determinism is not controlled or not controlled properly
by means of examples.
Based on the classiﬁcation and risk analyses, we presented
a set of mechanisms to control these types of nondeterminism in a systematic and efﬁcient manner. Our
contributions here are 3-fold. First, we observed that a
heuristic bound must be used to verify a non-deterministic
value (if it is veriﬁable), and argued that the safety property
of the system is not violated if the bound is estimated
incorrectly. Second, for non-veriﬁable pre-determinable
operations, we noted that the collective inputs from 2f + 1
replicas are required. Third, we illustrated a provisioning
method that handles non-veriﬁable post-determinable
operations, so that the system can quickly recover replicas
that have been damaged by malicious non-deterministic
values sent by the primary. We also presented proofs of
correctness for our mechanisms.
The implementation of these mechanisms is carried out
by extending the well-known BFT framework presented in
[1 – 4], which has very limited support for replica nondeterminism. We have conducted extensive experiments to
evaluate the performance of our prototype implementation.
We have shown that our mechanisms incur only a moderate
runtime overhead.
Our current implementation requires the application
to provide a number of callback functions to identify and
verify non-deterministic operations in the code for each
remote method, and to record and replay such operations.
It might require substantial expertise and time, on the
part of the application developers, to analyze the
application code and implement the callback functions
correctly. To alleviate such a burden on the application
developers, in future work, we plan to design tools that help
analyze the source code for non-deterministic operations
and that transparently record and replay non-deterministic
operations.
The problem of having to deal with non-veriﬁable nondeterminism is unique to the Byzantine fault model.
Besides our current approach, we plan to explore an
alternative solution, based on coin-tossing [24], that
generates a common secret among the replicas. In this
scheme, a threshold signature is used where each replica is
dealt a share of a private key and the replicas collectively
generate a group digital signature, which is later mapped to
a common secret. The beneﬁt of this approach is the
reduced communication cost (no explicit Byzantine
agreement on the common secret is necessary). However,
the computation cost for generating a threshold signature
might be signiﬁcant. We aim to develop a guideline on
when it is best to use which scheme, and eventually to add
the capability to our frame such that the best scheme is
selected dynamically based on the type of applications and
runtime context.
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